Paying Them What They Are Worth Improves the Integrity of Games
Stef Szymanski argues below that monopsonistic exploitation via international competition is a primary driving force behind the fixing of international matches.
We don’t hear much about players throwing games/shaving points in major professional team sports in the US these days. We can’t say that about past history when player salaries were controlled through monopsonistic practices.
Game fixing is more likely in US collegiate sports than in the pros, primarily men’s basketball and football, because the average player receives far less than he’s worth – a restriction made, it’s often said, for the sake of amateurism. The most likely players to fix games in collegiate sports are those in the money sports who have little shot at a professional career. Taking what amounts to bribes to fix the outcome of games is a way for them to earn income. And while the rent seekers – coaches, athletic directors, and others take extra large slices of the football and basketball pies, the integrity of the games is put at risk