Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Here's Yer Intangible Effect - Right In the Kisser, Alice!
Assessing the intangible impact of sports has become an important area of research in the past few years. Most research tries to document, or value intangible positive benefits like "world class city" status or the sense of community created by sports teams. A new NBER working paper by economists David Card and Gordon Dahl takes a different approach and finds an intriguing result. Here's the abstract:
I hope someone tells the Governator of California about this before they try to attract a new NFL team to LA.
Hat tip to Tyler at Marginal Revolution.
Family violence is a pervasive and costly problem, yet there is no consensus on how to interpret the phenomenon of violence by one family member against another. Some analysts assume that violence has an instrumental role in intra-family incentives. Others argue that violent episodes represent a loss of control that the offender immediately regrets. In this paper we specify and test a behavioral model of the latter form. Our key hypothesis is that negative emotional cues – benchmarked relative to a rationally expected reference point – make a breakdown of control more likely. We test this hypothesis using data on police reports of family violence on Sundays during the professional football season. Controlling for location and time fixed effects, weather factors, the pre-game point spread, and the size of the local viewing audience, we find that upset losses by the home team (losses in games that the home team was predicted to win by more than 3 points) lead to an 8 percent increase in police reports of at-home male-on-female intimate partner violence. There is no corresponding effect on female-on-male violence. Consistent with the behavioral prediction that losses matter more than gains, upset victories by the home team have (at most) a small dampening effect on family violence. We also find that unexpected losses in highly salient or frustrating games have a 50% to 100% larger impact on rates of family violence. The evidence that payoff-irrelevant events affect the rate of family violence leads us to conclude that at least some fraction of family violence is better characterized as a breakdown of control than as rationally directed instrumental violence.The typical negative external costs associated with professional sports include traffic, trash, and nuisance crimes like public intoxication. This result is similar to the one in a paper by Rees and Schnepel that appeared in the Journal of Sports Economics issue from the NAASE sessions at the WEAI conference.
I hope someone tells the Governator of California about this before they try to attract a new NFL team to LA.
Hat tip to Tyler at Marginal Revolution.
Labels: crime, economic impact, NFL; tradeoffs
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Harford on Distributing the Ball in Overtime NFL Games
Tim Harford writes about a novel solution to the overtime problem in the NFL*:
If the Super Bowl goes into overtime for the first time ever, it's fairly certain who will be victorious: the team that wins the coin toss. In the first round of the playoffs, the Chargers beat the Colts 23-17 in OT, marching down the field for a touchdown after winning the toss. In the 14 overtime games that produced a winner this season, the coin-toss victor won 10 of the games, more than 70 percent. Since 2002, the team that's gotten the toss has won more than 60 percent of overtime games.
...With a little ingenuity, there is a way for overtime to be both fair and fast. One solution is usually associated with cake-cutting: one person divides, the other chooses which half to take. In a football overtime, the divide-and-choose rule would dispense with the kickoff and just give the ball to one side. The coin-toss loser would decide how far forward the offense would start—say, the 30-yard line. The coin-toss winner would then decide whether to take possession or let the coin-toss loser have the ball at the 30. The nice thing about these rules is that they would naturally adapt to the game's changing dynamics. The current system, by contrast, seems to have been fair when introduced in 1974, but as field-goal kickers became more accurate, possession has become more valuable.
...An even more elegant solution to the overtime problem was proposed in 2002 by Chris Quanbeck, an electrical engineer (and Green Bay Packers fan). Quanbeck's idea was to auction off possession of the ball in the natural currency of the game: field position. The team that was willing to begin closest to its own goal line would receive the privilege of possession.
...With a little ingenuity, there is a way for overtime to be both fair and fast. One solution is usually associated with cake-cutting: one person divides, the other chooses which half to take. In a football overtime, the divide-and-choose rule would dispense with the kickoff and just give the ball to one side. The coin-toss loser would decide how far forward the offense would start—say, the 30-yard line. The coin-toss winner would then decide whether to take possession or let the coin-toss loser have the ball at the 30. The nice thing about these rules is that they would naturally adapt to the game's changing dynamics. The current system, by contrast, seems to have been fair when introduced in 1974, but as field-goal kickers became more accurate, possession has become more valuable.
...An even more elegant solution to the overtime problem was proposed in 2002 by Chris Quanbeck, an electrical engineer (and Green Bay Packers fan). Quanbeck's idea was to auction off possession of the ball in the natural currency of the game: field position. The team that was willing to begin closest to its own goal line would receive the privilege of possession.
Harford notes that the proposal was picked up by economist Yeon-Koo Che, an expert in auctions at Columbia University who, with his co-author Terrence Hendershott showed that the auction method was bettrer than both the coin-toss and the "divide and choose" ways of determining who gets the ball when teams had asymmetric priors about what was being divided.
The NFL has a lot more parity between teams than in college football. It would make for an interesting test of interleague comparison of parity if such an auction were used in both the NFL and in college football's various divisions. Of course there is a selection problem that needs to be solved. The teams that end up in over time were more likely to have been evenly-matched to begin with.*Update: thanks to John Palmer (Eclectecon) for the link.
Labels: NFL; tradeoffs
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Two tensions in modern American sport
1) Athletics vs. academics on campus
The allocation of time spent by student-athletes between sport and study is a long running source of tension on America's campuses. This rather lengthy piece at USAToday focuses on a University of Minnesota task force that dealt with the issue. It should be clear that a school has a problem when degree programs are established or designed for the purpose of athletes (using funds meant for general education), although the article doesn't quite get to that point. Support programs which allow student athletes to compete with their peers in the classroom -- but not cheat, which was an issue at Minnesota -- are the right way to enable students to excel both off and on the field. I find the approach of the Minnesota wrestling coach on this point (to paraphrase, athletes can get an MA later if they are interested in a real degree) somewhat annoying.
Update: Via Glenn in the comments, I see that the story linked above is part of a spread at USAToday. The lead story is "Athletes guided toward 'beating the system'." Glenn points to a particularly interesting graphic, "Same team, same major." The graphic itself is a bit kludgy to use, but the data can be seen in Table form by clicking the "View List" button on the right. You can narrow the list by clicking on your favorite school and or sport in the "Show Results By" box. For Clemson Football, the major is "Parks, Recreation, and Tourism." But note that the stats are for teams with 25% or more of the athletes in the same major, and the figure for Clemson Football is 11 out of 33 players. Some sports have most of the team included, but for football the figures are uniformly low for most schools. The highest number of players listed in football is 59 at the Naval Academy, where 20 are majoring in ................. (drum roll) ................. Economics!
2) Retired vs. current NFL players
I missed this when it came out, but in case you haven't seen it, here is a snip from Alan Schwarz' report on a class action lawsuit between retirees and the Players Association:
The allocation of time spent by student-athletes between sport and study is a long running source of tension on America's campuses. This rather lengthy piece at USAToday focuses on a University of Minnesota task force that dealt with the issue. It should be clear that a school has a problem when degree programs are established or designed for the purpose of athletes (using funds meant for general education), although the article doesn't quite get to that point. Support programs which allow student athletes to compete with their peers in the classroom -- but not cheat, which was an issue at Minnesota -- are the right way to enable students to excel both off and on the field. I find the approach of the Minnesota wrestling coach on this point (to paraphrase, athletes can get an MA later if they are interested in a real degree) somewhat annoying.
Update: Via Glenn in the comments, I see that the story linked above is part of a spread at USAToday. The lead story is "Athletes guided toward 'beating the system'." Glenn points to a particularly interesting graphic, "Same team, same major." The graphic itself is a bit kludgy to use, but the data can be seen in Table form by clicking the "View List" button on the right. You can narrow the list by clicking on your favorite school and or sport in the "Show Results By" box. For Clemson Football, the major is "Parks, Recreation, and Tourism." But note that the stats are for teams with 25% or more of the athletes in the same major, and the figure for Clemson Football is 11 out of 33 players. Some sports have most of the team included, but for football the figures are uniformly low for most schools. The highest number of players listed in football is 59 at the Naval Academy, where 20 are majoring in ................. (drum roll) ................. Economics!
2) Retired vs. current NFL players
I missed this when it came out, but in case you haven't seen it, here is a snip from Alan Schwarz' report on a class action lawsuit between retirees and the Players Association:
Ending the three-week trial in United States District Court, the jury on Monday found that the union’s licensing subsidiary, Players Inc., had used the identities of thousands of retired players without compensating them. A key example was the union’s agreement with EA Sports, which generates at least $25 million a year for the use of player identities in the popular Madden video game series.Here is Schwarz' story in the NY Times, and here is a transcript of the closing arguments. Apparently, the NFLPA took an active role in "anonymizing" the former players in the Madden video game. It's not clear to me why this would be in the interest of EA Sports. If I were to "re-play" the Ice Bowl on Madden NFL, I'd want Herb Adderly, Don Meredith, Bart Starr et al. to be an explicit part of the experience. It is possible that "likenesses" for well known players and explicit anonymity for all was the optimal solution for EA Sports, but that doesn't negate the right to licensing revenue for the people who took part in the original performance.
The majority of sports licensing revenue derives from the use of active players. The Madden game features more than 100 past teams, like the 1966 Green Bay Packers, and players on those teams argued that although their names and pictures had not been included, many of their individual characteristics — talent level, experience, height and so on — were. The players argued that the group licensing agreement they had signed with Players Inc. required that revenue from such deals be shared with them.
Herb Adderley, who played cornerback on the 1966 Packers, was the name plaintiff for the class that filed suit.
“They betrayed us,” Adderley said of the union in a telephone interview. “We put our trust and faith in them, and they betrayed us.”
Labels: academia, NFL, NFL; tradeoffs
Wednesday, January 23, 2008
NFL Playoff Prep: Playing v. Resting
The Giants surge to the Super Bowl steered me back to an MSNBC article by Dan Pompeii: Rest Up for the Playoffs? No Clear Cut Answer. He lays out the kind of tradeoff that is stock and trade for economists:
But the overriding goal during meaningless games late in the year always should be to prepare the team to win in the playoffs. Whether that is achieved through playing scrubs or acting as if each game is the Super Bowl depends on the team ... in most cases, trying to get players fresh and healthy makes the most sense. So let's say Joseph Addai is feeling worn out. His production has dipped. He has a slight muscle pull and a deep bruise. Why wouldn't Dungy have him sit out a game or two, or play him sparingly? ... Some will argue that sitting players for a couple of games will lead to rust.
Pompeii notes that team condition may dictate the answer:
At the end of the 2005 season, after losing to go 13-1, Indianapolis treated the last two games more like pre-season games, using their starters sparingly. By the time that they played Pittsburgh in the Division playoffs, they had gone 4 weeks since playing at their competitive peak, and it showed. In 2006, the Colts were struggling toward the end of the season and played the season out to try to better their playoff position. They ended up in the Wild Card round but played their way to the Super Bowl. This season looked more like 2005. In contrast, the Giants played out the regular season at full tilt in a great game with the Patriots that didn't mean anything for playoff position. Even though they lost they game, their play in the next three games only seemed to improve.
If somebody out there has looked at this or does so, I would like to hear.
But the overriding goal during meaningless games late in the year always should be to prepare the team to win in the playoffs. Whether that is achieved through playing scrubs or acting as if each game is the Super Bowl depends on the team ... in most cases, trying to get players fresh and healthy makes the most sense. So let's say Joseph Addai is feeling worn out. His production has dipped. He has a slight muscle pull and a deep bruise. Why wouldn't Dungy have him sit out a game or two, or play him sparingly? ... Some will argue that sitting players for a couple of games will lead to rust.
Pompeii notes that team condition may dictate the answer:
Every coach has to look at each situation uniquely. He shouldn't have a blanket philosophy that covers every team and every individual. Every coach has to look at each situation uniquely. He shouldn't have a blanket philosophy that covers every team and every individual."I think you take it on a case-by-case basis," Del Rio said. "You have to do what's best for your team. It depends on the state of your team."
Nonetheless, Pompeii but leans toward the resting option.
There is merit to the [rust] argument. But I'd rather risk having a rusty team than a banged up one.I have not had time to investigate the issue with systematic data, but I'm beginning to suspect that Pompeii may underestimate the rust problem. While not a topic studied much by economists, peak competitive performance is not just generated at the flip of a switch. Playing at full speed against top caliber opponents is likely to improve performance much more than sitting -- that seems axiomatic.
At the end of the 2005 season, after losing to go 13-1, Indianapolis treated the last two games more like pre-season games, using their starters sparingly. By the time that they played Pittsburgh in the Division playoffs, they had gone 4 weeks since playing at their competitive peak, and it showed. In 2006, the Colts were struggling toward the end of the season and played the season out to try to better their playoff position. They ended up in the Wild Card round but played their way to the Super Bowl. This season looked more like 2005. In contrast, the Giants played out the regular season at full tilt in a great game with the Patriots that didn't mean anything for playoff position. Even though they lost they game, their play in the next three games only seemed to improve.
If somebody out there has looked at this or does so, I would like to hear.
Labels: NFL; tradeoffs
